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RECENT COST SCHEDULE VARIATIONS 
IN THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The nineteenth century witnessed the passing of one of America's 
most colorful technicians, namely, the cobbler. The production ot 
boots and shoes in the United States was started in a small way qy 
the primitive shoemaker who worked at his bench in his own home making 
shoes to order for the community, and the itinerant shoemaker who 
traveled from village to village, carrying tools on his back, doing 
repair work and often contracting to shoe an entire family (the work 
might take a week or longer, the contract including his entertainment); 
next came the small shop which accomodated three or four workmen, 
followed closely b,y the primitive factory, in which much of the work 
was still done by hand. and which had an output of only a few pairs 'a 
day. The modern tactory of today can turn out 75,000 pairs every work-
day ot the year. This marvelous change, which is due in a large measure 
to the introduction of machinery, has taken place within a period ot 
75 years. 
For more than six hundred years prior to 1858, when McKay sewing 
machine was introduced, the methods of shoe making were not greatly 
changed. The list of machines invented, which followed closely the 
introduction of the McKay machine, goes well into the thousands, and 
the inventions by which they were improved are almost numberless. 
Steam power was first introducted to run shoe-machinery in 1863. gas 
engines in 1885, and electric motors in 1889. Each innovation, was 
readily received because it reduced time cost. the reduction of Which 
was deemed infallibly wise at all times. They also necessitated diV-
ision of labor, a factor instrumental in itself in reducing time cost. 
The various operations necessary for the construction of a shoe 
heretofore were performed by one man; they were now divided among 
several workmen. each doing one particular part. In a shop. of course, 
it soon became evident that some men were usually proficient in certain 
operations. some in cutting, others in preparing the soles, fastening 
them to the uppers. etc •• By this constant attention to a part1cular 
part of a shoe, the worker was able to accomplish much more in a given 
length of time and to do that work better and with less effort than 
when making the entire shoe. This division of labor continued to in-
crease, and in a much larger degree, after the introduction ot machinery. 
At the present time there are between two and three hundred operations 
on a shoe (depending upon the method of construction), and 1n many large 
establishments each operation is pertormedby different employees. 
Still another means of lowering time costs has been the proper 
arrangement of the several departments so as to form an unbroken chain 
in performing the various operations. all following in one direction 
throughout the factory. This is usually accomplished ~ locat1ng on 
the top floor of the factory the patterns and the upper leather cutting 
department, where the various parts ot the upper portion ot the shoe 
are cut and then sent to the next floor below to be stitched together 
to form the upper. These st1tched uppers then go to the lasting de-
partment, where they are pulled over the last and united to oertain parts 
~ 
sent there trom the sole leather department. These assembled shoes then 
oontinue on to the bottoming, tinishing, treeing. paoking, and shipping 
departments, arranged in the order names, exoept the sole leather depart-
ment, whioh is usually looated in the basement or in a separate plant 
beoause ot the heavy material and the heavy maohinery neoessary in the 
outting and preparation ot the soles and heels. Thus it is seen that the 
raw material tor the upper is started on the top tloor ot the taotory, 
continues down through the various departments, and ends on the tirst !.loor 
in the packing department as a oompleted shoe, ready tor shippent. 
It is only sinoe the time ot Frederiok W. Taylor's works that the 
so-oalled soientitio managers, or to put it more exaotly, managers using 
the soien~itio method, have taken their plaoe in industry. Their duty 
consisted in the produotion ot the produot with the least outlay ot rev-
enues, but instead ot this they seemed to have oonoentrated their ettorts 
on the oonstant reduetion.ot time oosts. They lost sight ot the taot 
that there was a point beyond whioh the adoption ot maohinery would result 
in higher marginal oosts per operation in the industry. ~ oase in point 
is the 'pulling over' operation whioh, atter the introduotion ot machinery, 
resulted in relatively higher marginal oosts in this operation. Still 
another instanoe was the Knox 'blooker' in the sole outting department 
whioh added 1% to the marginal oost ot sole outting. The point at which 
it would have been better not to use maohinery in plaoe ot men has never 
been asoertained. It appears that management has been so wholly oonverted 
to the eoonomw ot the maohine that it has oonstantly introduoed maohinery 
without first determining the cost of an operation before and after the 
introduction of the specific maohine. 
The Boot and Shoe Industry seems to be a oase par exoellenoe ot 
the aforementioned practioe. No reoord oan be found of a study ot 
the eoonomio soundness of the substitution of maohinery for men in 
this field, yet labor has steadily been displaced by maohines. Shoe-
makers were formerly highly-skilled high-wage workmen; maohines and 
unskilled workers have now supplanted them. This immediately suggests 
a transformation of the oost sohedules in this industry, for labor 
charges have been lessened while oapital and overhead oosts must have 
neoessarily increased due to the greater use of oapital goods in the 
form of maohinery. If the sooial losses and the other losses due to 
technological employment are disregarded, the true gain or loss for 
this industry oan be obtained by subtraoting from those expenses which 
formerly were incurred and which are not now inourred, those expense. 
whioh are now incurred and whioh formerly did not oocur. This amounts 
to the finding of the inorease in the capital and overhead oosts and 
the decrease in the labor oosts due to the introduction of maohinery. 
If the former is greater than the latter the industry has not gained 
eoonomically by the introduction of maohinery; if the latter is g~eater 
than the tormer the introduction of maohinery has been sensible, al-
though as suggested the element ot chanoe rather than the ~agerial 
factor has been the responsible force. 
It is unfortunate that,aooess to any speoifio firm has been denied 
the author. The work would have been muoh more tangible and the results 
~ 
far more effective if actually taken from a concern in operation. 
Working with information released for public inspection detracts 
from the actuality of conditiOns for complete datum is seldom, it 
ever, released by any tirm. The results obtained will be of a 
general nature, the conclusions necessarily empirical, and con-
sequently will not be applicable to any specific firm. 
/ 
OHAPTER II 
THE STATUS OF THE LABOR FAOTOR IN TEE BOOT 
AND SHOE MANUFAOTURING INDUSTRY 
The replacement ot labor by machinery necessarily involves some 
shitts in the contribution ot the labor and capital tactors, and 
usually ~esults in a lower return tor the labor tactor. Now it is 
evident that transitions have taken place in the Boot and Shoe In-
dustr~, and it is not without reason that it can be said that labor 
has been displaced therein. Statistics released by the Federal Reserve 
Board Show that the average monthly index ot employment therein in 1932 
was approximately 22% below the 1923-25 average. They point out that 
since 1923 employment in this industry reveals a downward tendency. 
During the years 1924-1927 employment remained more or less constant, 
but since 1927 employment in this industry has presented an entirely 
ditteren!.il tendency as the accompanying chart indicates. Aside trom 
the slight gain registered in the boom year ot 1929 tactory employment 
has dropped very sharply. This decline is apt to be overlooked, coming 
as it does in a depression period through whi~h our erratic business 
world is now passing. In the last tive years we have seen industry 
topple trom the peak ot activity into the mire ot contusion and dis-
organization. Unemployment has increased due to the sharp decrease 
in the ~d tor industrial products. This decrease in demand re-
tlects itselt in the tremendous curtailment in the production ot goods 
by producers, especially producers ot capital goods. The Federal 
Reserve Board statistics show that the 1932 mOhthly average ot all 
• - This term when used herein reters to leather. boots and shoes 
exclUSively. 
industrial production was 47% lower than that ot the peak year o~but 
three years betore. .Oonsidering the tact that this statistical data 
represents at least 8Q% ot all industrial production in the United 
States and then viewing the tact that production therein has almost 
been halved, it can readily be seen why 'depression' is so pre-eminent 
in this country today. It is not so ditficult to see, theretore, why 
unemployment has become so conspicuous, and unemployment ot shoemakers 
could easily be misplaced into the category of cyclical unemployment. 
The term 'misplaced' was purposely used to emphasize the tact 
that this unemployment was not due to the cyclical position ot the 
business world today_ Unemployed shoemakers have a ver,y dismal outlook 
before them. Their position is caused by internal rather than external 
conditions and their chance ot being rehired is very problematical, 
indeed. They are victims ot technological changes. The unemployed ot 
other industries in the main will be reabsorbed when the depression 
passes. Their state is one caused ~ the lack ot demand tor goods 
which caused manutacturers to curtail production (and consequently 
discharge laborers) in order that the supply of goods will just equal 
the demand tor goods. They were not supplanted by technological inn-
ovations, nor were their jobs cancelled by improved techniques, but 
instead they were simply no longer needed in the production mechanism 
due to lack ot need ot production caused by the talling ot ot demand. 
With the return ot the more favorable position in the business cyole 
demand tor products will be stimulated and labor will again be needed 
· . 
to satisfy the needs of the producer. Laborers who are now idle 
will then be absorbed by the industry from whence they came. The 
state of the unemployed shoemaker is not akin to this for in the 
shoe industry unemployment has increased by leaps and bounds while 
shoe production has shown but a small comparative decline. This 
means that the Idle Laborers from this industry will not benefit 
greatly by the upswing in business cycle for they cannot hope to 
be reabsorbed in the industry in whioh they were previously engaged. 
They will either have to compete with those in the labor reserve of 
other industries or else remain idle. 
Shoes are obviously a necessity, and because of their very 
nature must oonstantly be subjected to the same degree of wear. 
This oommodity is highly favored with a comparatively inelastic 
demand. Production statistios show that people demand that they 
ve shod in spite of the existing hard times. While other industries 
have had to stand by and watch the literal bottom fallout of their 
markets the shoe industry has eVidenoed comparatively no deoline 
in the demand for its produ~~. A glanoe at the aooompanying table, 
(Table I) will immediately show the productively advantageous position 
this manufacturing 1~dustry has over industry in general. 
•• 
TABLE I 
Variations in the Annual Index of Production of Combined Manufactures 
as Compared with the Same Index Constructed for the Shoe Industry. 
Year 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
(Monthly Average 1923-1925. 100) 
Monthly Average Monthly Average Federal Reserve 
Boots and Shoes Indexed as Year Board's (b) 
Produced (a) Shoe Industry Combined Index 
Thous. of Prs. Production of Manufactures 
29260 106.6 1923 101. 
26102 95.1 1924 94. 
26963 98.3 1925 105. 
27043 98.5 1926 108. 
28634 104.3 1927 106. 
28696 104.5 1928 112. 
30116 109.7 1929· 119. 
25347 92.3 1930 95. 
26353 96.0 1931 80. 
26108 95.1 1932 63. 
(a) "Compiled by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, from oyer 1,100 firms each month, 
compriling more than 98% of the total production 
according to the 1929 Census of Manufactures." 
(b) "Compiled by Federal Reserve Board, Division of 
Research and Stati,tica, from 57 individual aeries 
of data representing the production of about 34 
industries and eatimated to represent, directly 
and indirectly, about 80% of~the total industrial 
production of the United States~ 
". 
~ 
------------------------------------------------------j 
This shows that the oombined index ot produotion has been s~Jected 
to far greater fluotuations than has the index of produotion in the shoe 
industry. The most striking of all is the period since the boom year of 
1929. The year 1930 showed a decrease in the annual index of produotion 
in the oombined index of 2Q% of 1929 produotion, while the boot and shoe 
industry had a deorease of 16% of 1929 produotion for the same period. 
In 1931, while general industry lobbed off another 13% of its 1929 prod-
uotive schedule, the boot and shoe industry reversed the downswing of 
1930 and pioked up 31 pOints of the 16% deoline, putting itself but l2~ 
below the monthly average of 1929 as oompared to 33% below 1929 regis-
tered by general industry. Again in 1932 the shoe industry gained & 
oomparative advantage, although it lost one of the pOints it had picked 
up in 1931. The combined index of industries showed another l~ deorease 
from the 1929 level making a total of a 47% deorease from the 1929 figure. 
The shoe industry, on the other hand, lost but an additional one per oent 
of the 1929 index so that in 1932, While the combined index of produotion 
was 47% below 1929 production, the shoe industry was merely about 13i% 
below the 1929 boom standard. This is merely saying in other terms that 
in 1932 shoe production was 95.2% of its normal (1923-1925=100 average) 
production while the combined index of production was but 63% of its 
normal (1923-1925:100 average) production. 
These facts are of great significance to the unemployed shoemaker 
since they show conclusively that their state is probably a perpetual 
one. The demand for shoe factory employees has decreased far more 
rapidly than has the demand for shoes. This is due to the introduction 
of maohines whioh have oonstantly inoreased the output per man hour. A 
., 
oomparison ot shoe produotion with shoe taotory employment tigured on & 
1923-25:100 basis will show oonolusively the inorease in the shoe taotory 
employees' etfioiency. (See Table II). 
TABLE II 
Ohart Showing Deoline in Shoe Factory Employment 
in Spite ot Stability ot Produotion 
(Monthly Average 1923-1925=100) 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
Shoe Factory 
Employment 105.6 96.6 97.8 96.8 97.7 93.7 94.8 86.7 81.5 77.7 
Fed.Res.Bd. 
Indexed Shoe 
Production 106.6 95.1 98.3 98.5 104.3 104.5 109.7 92.3 96.0 95.1 
(See Table I) 
The above table shows that in 1932, 77% ot the number of shoe tactory 
employees employed during 1923-25 can now produce 9~ ot the amount ot 
produot produoed by the one hundred per oent 1923-25 torce. In other 
words, it now takes but 81.7% ot the number employed in shoe taotories 
during 1923-25 to produce a like number ot shoes to~. These tigures 
are still more important when one considers that even it shoe production 
goes up to the 1923-25 leyel 18% ot the shoemakers will still be unem-
ployed due to teohnologioal improvements installed by the industry. 
The rise in etfioienoy of the shoe taotory employee is readily seen 
it the above tigures are indexed.' By dividing the shoe production by the 
I,P"' 
-~------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
number involv.ed in their produotion the relative effioienoy ot 1ab~r 
oan be obtained. This etfioienoy table follows: 
TABLE III 
Ohart Showing General Index ot 
Etfioienoy of the Shoe Faotory Employee. 
1923-25=100 
1923 - 100.95 
1924 - 98.36 
1925 - 100.59 
1926 - 101.75 
1927 - 106.46 
1928 - 111.53 
1929 - 115.71 
1930 - 106.46 
1931 - 117.79 
1932 - 122.39 
From this it oan be seen that the output per laborer working with maoh-
inery has been increasing oonstant1y trom year to year. One laborer in 
a shoe tactory today can do the work ot 1.2239 shoe taoto~ 1a~orers ot 
1923-25. Labor is, therefore, 22.39.% more produotive today than it was 
during the period 1923-25. It is important to investigate how the re-
turn to labor has been afteoted by this ohange. 
The inorease in effioienoe ot the shoe laborer is not ev.idenoed in 
the faotory payrolls, for in this industry taotory payrolls show a def-
inite downward trend. The laborer certainly has not shared in the re-
sults of inoreased effeotiveness. The annual index released by the 
Federal 'Reserve Board shows that the 77.7% ot the 1923-25 average who 
were fortunate enough to work during 1932 reoeived but 50.a% ot the 
1923-25 average pay. ,A oomparative array of the annual indexes ot 
factory employment and payrolls in this industry follows, in com~ne with 
the average monthly production for each year. The per capita pay is 
obtained by dividing the Shoe Factory Payroll Index given by the Federal 
Reserve Board by the Shoe Factory Employment Index also given by the 
Federal Reserve Board. 
TABLE IV 
Chart Showing Indexed Production, Employment, and Payrolls 
of Shoe Factories for Years 1923-1932 Inolusive. 
(Monthly Average 1923-1925:100) 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1~30 1931 1932 
Monthly Aver. 
Shoe Prod. 29260 26102 26963 27043 2863428696 30116 25347 26353 26108 
Actual 
Thousand Pairs 
Above indexed 
Table I 106.62 95.12 98.25 98.55 104.34 104..57 109.75 92.36 96.03 95.18 
Shoe Factory 
Employment 105.6 96.6 97.8 96.8 97.7 93.7 94.8 86.7 81.5 77.7 
Table II 
Shoe Factory 
PayrOlls 106.7 95.4 97.9 97.5 98.7 91.7 92.7 73.0 63.2 50.8 
Fed.Res.Bd. 
Per Capita 
Pay Index 101.4 98.76 100.1.100.72 101.02$7.7.86 gt.78 84.2 77.54 65.38 
Direct comparison of the above figures is possible since all indexes have 
computed with the common 1923-25-100 basis. An examination ot 1932 figures 
show that 77.7% of the number ot workers formerly employed produced 95.18.% 
of the former production at 50.8.% of the former labor cost of production. 
"'"&, 
Oonverting this by dividing the payroll by the employment we see that 
. 4 
labor now reoeived o5.3~ of its former earnings per oapita. A glance 
at the per capita pay will show that this has steadily been decreasing 
and since there has been an accompanying increase in labor efficiency 
there is no reason ,to assume that an increase in pay would result in a 
corresponding increase in produotivity, nor is there any economic reason 
why pay should be increased. It can be conoluded from this that the 
productivity of the labor factor is not in direct rela tion to the 
pay received by the laborers. 
Now the figure has heretofore been determined as to the number of 
workers needed to bring production to the 100% level. Combining these 
we find that 81.1% of the number of workers used in 1923-25.,working at 
a per capita rate of o5.3~ of the pay paid at that time, will today 
produce a like number of shoes. In other words, a manufacturer of shoes 
tOday can have the same number ot shoes made as the manufacturer of 
1923-25 at a 47% reduction in labor costs, i. e.t the labor cost tor a 
given volume ot output in 1932 was 53.41% ot the 1923-25 average. Con-
verting other years in the same manner, we find that tor every dollar 
spent in 1923-25 tor labor the toll owing amounts would ha~ to be spent 
to produoe a like number ot shoes in the respective years. 
TABlE V 
, Ohart Showing .Amount Needed to be Spent by a 
Manufacturer tor Labor to Produce 1923-25. 
Average Production ot Shoes, 
1923 - 1.0007 
1924 - 1.0029 
1925 - .9964 
1926 - .9893 
1927 - .9459 
1928 - .8768 
1929 - .8476 
1930 - .7904. 
1931 - .6581 
1932 - .534a 
OHD'lE:R III 
'WHOLESALE PRIOE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE BOOT AND 
SHOE IlANUl'ACmBDS' FINISBD PRODUOT 
It has been pOinted out that the Shoe Industry in recent years has 
been tavored with a tremendous drop in labor c·osts. It is only natural. 
therefore, that one would immediately inspect the price movements of this 
commodity with the expectation of tinding some parallel reduction in 
prices. Again, in the study of price movements we must first revert to 
an insight of general production to see how the movements of wholesale 
prices in general have been during these recent years of economic distress 
The United States Department of Labor has compiled an index of wholesale 
finished products of 582 various manutacturers, an impressive list worthy 
of consideration as a pictorial guide to wholesale prices. This price 
index tells us that the trend of wholesale prices has been downward since 
the latter part ot 1925. " .. slightly upward variation occurred in 1927 
but it changed downward very soon thereafter, and wholesale commodity 
prices have tallen sharply since that time. There has been no apprec-
iable rise in wholesale prices since September of 1928. Prices narl, in 
December ot 1932, are at the lowest figure yet registered, being but 
Sa% of 1926 no~l price, & reduction ot 32%. 
Akin to general commodities the wholesale price ot shoes has 
likewise been on the~oline since September of 1928. The shoe industry 
had an advantage, however, for while prioes of the general group ot 
finished manutactured produots fell below the 1925-100 level in the 
-I! 
". 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------; 
of 1926 and never again regained this par tigure ~he shoe industry reg-
., 
istered an upward swing in prices in the year 1927. and managed to kteep 
a.bove the 100 (1926)' level until late in the ye ar ot 1930. General 
commodities, having never attained this above par butter, sutfered muoh 
more intensely, as is evidenoed by the tact that the shoe industry en-
joyed above par (1926) prioe for four years after general industry had 
fallen below par. In tact, throughout the last tive years the Wholesale 
prioe ot boots and shoes has been about 15% higher than the wholesale 
price ot manutaoture4 goods in general. The quotation o~'Deoember ot 
1932 had shoes at a new low, 83.a% of the 1926 (100) level. Compare 
this to the price level ot general oommodities whioh at this time was 
listed at 6a% of the 1926 (100) level. When one considers the stable 
demand to whioh the shoe industry caters as compared to the highly 
fluotuating demand for general commodities these price faots beoome 
potent. We have an industry with a stable demand, with a sharp lasting 
reduotion in labor cost but whose prices have been maintained a a hlgher 
level than slster industries whose positions have not been near so 
fortunate. 
For direct comparison purposes it becomes necessary to convert the 
1926 prioe quotations to the same basic 100 which was the point of ret-
erenoe in the labor statistics used. sinoe the U. S. Department ot Labor 
index it figured on a 1926-100 basis whereas the labor oost index is 
tigured on a 1925-25-100 basis. This ~nverslon can be made by tirst 
taklng the average ot the given indexes for 1923-25, and then dividing 
eaoh year's index number glven by this result. 
,. 
TABLE VI 
Revision ot Wholesale Root and Shoe Prioe Index 
From 1926-100 Basis to 
1923-25 Average=lOO Basis 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
u.S. DEPT OF 
LABOR (&.) 99.1 98.4 100.5 100. 102.6 109.9 106.3 102.3 93.7 Erf.99 
Index 1926=100 
Above Index 
Revised 1923-25 99.8 99.1 101.2 100.7 102.3 110.6 l07.Q 102.7 94.33 88.58 
Average-100 
Basis 
(a) U. S;. Dept. ot Labor, Bureau ot Labor Statistios 
That prioe tluotuations have not kept apaoe with the reduction in 
labor oosts is immediately evident. The most etteotive manner ot showing 
this taot is b,y the oomparative method in whioh one may show that tor every 
dollar reoeived tor shoes in 1923-25, the manufaoturer is today reoeiving 
eighty-eight oents, but tor every dollar the manufaoturer had to ~ tor 
labor in 1923-25 he must today merely pay about titty-tour oents. This 
retention ot tavorable prioes, oombined with the stable demand should have 
staved ott the depression tor shoe manutaoturers. It is the general in-
crease ot manufacturing cost to a point wherein the manufacturers cannot 
sell the goods produced at a gain that oauses the crumbling ot the business 
struoture. The collapse ot wholesale prioes produoes depressions. It all 
manufacturers were always a:ble to sell all the goods that they produce at 
a gain there would be no depression periods. Prosperity periods are said 
to be those in whioh the demand quiokens to suoh a pOint that prioes rise, 
and history pOints out that price constituents usually lag after Piice 
variations both in periods ot rising prices and in periods ot talling 
prices, this phenomena being especially true ot the labor tactor. 
This leads one to the conclusion that the Shoe Industry has appar-
ently been enjoying a prolonged prosperity period. There is somewhat ot 
.. .,. 
a reversal of ordinary procedures but the result is the same. Herein the 
cart has gone ahead of the horse; labor has slumped while prices have 
been maintained. Labor, the lagging factor, has decreased much faster 
than the decrease in prices. This is truly a prosperity period tor these 
manufacturers, since they benefit by a fall in labor costs at a rate in 
excess of that of the accompanying fall in prices in exactly the same way 
as they would benefit by an increase in prices at a rate higher than the 
accompanying increase in labor costs, a state Which is usually the pros-
perity period. In so tar as the labor factor is concerned the shoe manuf-
acturers have enjoyed an abnormal prosperity period. 
It is wholly possible that the advantages gained ot the labor tactor 
have been cancelled by variations in one ot the other factors. There 
must, however. be some explanation ot the wide difference that has accrued 
between labor costs and prices. It is an accounting truism that the whole-
sale price ot an article is equal to labor costs plus material costs plus 
sales and administrative costs plus protits. This is based on the ~ebraic 
axiom that the whole is equal to the sum ot its parts. Now it is also 
axiomatic in algebra that equals must be subtracted trom equals it the 
result is to be equals. In the case in point, this is of importance tor 
on the prioe side of our equation we have a reduotion of 11.42% 01 the 
1923-25 level. On the opposite side there must be a like peroentage 
reduction of the total oonstituents taken together. The only oonstituent 
as yet examined shows a reduotion of 46.48% of the 1923-25 level, 
oertainly far in exoess ot the total period. This great reduotion in 
the labor oonstituent must be oounterbalanoed by a rise in all or part 
of the other oonstituents. This neoessitates a study ot the fluotuations 
of these other taotors. 
-ClIAPI'ER IV 
CHANGES IN THE COST OF SHOE LEATHER 
The second constituent part mentioned in the makeup of the whole-
sale price is the material cost, but because it is placed second in the 
numerical enumeration it must not be thought that this constituent is a 
secondary one. Material costs are as much primary costs as are labor 
costs. Both are primary, and both are essential to the making of a 
product. All products have these two factors contributing to their 
cost, although the proportion in which they are involved is subject to 
variation and is dependent upon the article itself or upon the level ot 
the arts in the industry in which it is made. This is clearly seen if 
a diamond is compared to an oil painting. Eoth have great value because 
of scarcity, but in one the value is due to a scarc1ty of the ability 
involved. while the other value is due to a scarcity of the material 
involved. The labor cost in the grinding of diamonds is but a fractional 
part of the sum received for diamonds: the material cost in an oil 
painting is but a fractional part of the sum received for the picture. 
If raw diamonds were free economic goods, the value of a finished diamond 
would be scarcely more than the labor cost involved in grinding. and 
likewise if everyone could paint with equal ability the value of a 
painting would be scarcely more than the cost of the materials. 
Now it has been pOinted out that the once highly-skilled shoemaker 
has been supplanted by unskilled machine operators in the shoe industry. 
It has also been shown that the withdrawal of the skill element has not 
materially reduced the price of shoes. If labor and material constitute 
- -
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the bulk of the cost of shoes, the logical place to look for the ~ounter­
balancing of this decrease in labor costs is the material costs. There 
is no reason to conclude that there has been an increase in the quantity 
of material in shoes. As a matter of fact, the quantity of material used 
is somewhat less due to the change from high to low-cut shoes since 1919-
1920. We need. therefore, but consider the price of the material used in 
shoes. In the Leather Boot and Shoe Industry this should be reflected 
in the fluctuations of the prices of the leather used in the manufacture 
of shoes. 
Shoe leather is divided into two distinct groups, namely, sole 
leather and upper leather. A portion of each of these types is essen-
tially needed in the construction of every shoe. For this reason the 
price fluctuations of both types must be given ample consideration in 
our study in order to establish a clearer picture of the desired var-
iations in the cost of the material constituent of shoes. Because of 
the variety existent in the proportions which these materials are com-
bined in the makeup of the different kinds of shoes, it is deemed wise 
to segregate each in our study of prices thereby splitting the bl~ket 
heading of material cost .. into sole leather costs and upper leather costs, 
with the underlying purpose of showing more definite and reliable relation 
ships between the components of leather costs. Consideration will first 
be given to the price fluctuations of the sole leather constituent, and 
then consideration will be given the upper leather component. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, in their wholesale price bulletin 
« 
releases, issued the following annual prices of representative sole 
leather material. Since oak and union backs, bends, and sides con-
stitute over 96% of the entire cattle sole leather produced, it can 
be seen that these figures will be quite reliable as a guide to the 
price of this constituent. 
TABLE VII 
The Monthly Average Price Per Pound of Sole Shoe Leather 
Sole, Oak, (a) 
Sc oured Backs 
Boston,Per Lb. 
Since 1923 in Dollars 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
.511 .449 .482 .438 .493 .641 .529 .4&4 .365 .291 
Sole, Oak, (e) 
Union Backs, .492 .406 .470 .429 .488 .634 .509 .432 .350 .279 
Steers,N.Y.Lb. 
(&) Oompiled by U. S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
As was the case before, actual price figures are not as helpful 
for comparative purposes as are index numbers. In place of the actual 
price figures a price index table will be constructed with 1923-25 
average price equaling the basic 100. The results of this statistical 
operation (which is the more illustrative picture of the information 
desired) are as followsl 
TABLE VIII 
\ Ohart Showing Index ot Wholesale Sole Shoe 
Leather Prices For Years 1923-1932 
Monthly Average 1923-25=100 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 19291930 1931 1932: 
Sole, Oak, 
Scoured Backs, 106.2 .912 100.2 .• 910 102.5 133.2 110. 94. 75.8 60.5 
Boston 
Sole, Oak. 
Union Backs. 107.7 .89 103 
Steers, N. Y. 
94. 107. 139 111 946 76.7 61.1 
The above table clearly illuatrates the trend of the prices of the 
new material. Since the price of this commodity is ex'actly the same as 
the cost of this material to the shoe manufacturer, the shoe manufacturer 
being the party who pays the price, it is immediately evident that sole 
leather has not contributed towards the keeping of the price of shoes 
at its high level. Since 1928 sole leather prices have been reduoed more 
than fifty per oent. The shoe manufacturer has again apparently gained 
from the depression for he has driven the price ot this neoessary material 
to a pOint less than half of what it was five years ago while he has 
suoceeded in preventing the purchaser of his goods from lowering the 
price ot the goods which he sells more than twenty per cent in the same 
period. It will be remembered that tor every dollar the shoe manufaoturer 
reoeived tor his goods in 1923-25 he reoeived eighty-eight oents in 1932. 
Contrast this with the results shown apove wherein for every dollar the 
shoe manufacturer spent for sole material in 1923-25 he was obliged to 
spend but sixty-one cents in the year 1932. 
24. 
TABLE IX 
The Monthly Average Price Per Square Foot ot Upper 
LeatheI"BolIDn(e) 
1) Calt, 
Chrome "B" 
Grade Sq.Ft. 
2) Glazed Kid 
Top Grade 
Sq. Ft. 
3) Side Black 
Shoe Leather Since 1923 in Dollara 
19,23 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 193% 
.443 .455 .472 .453 .489 .558 .496 .4.30 •• 345 .259 
.688 .673 .683 .675: .677 .715 .725 .692 .600 .4.36 
Ohrome Tanned .260 .264;. .274 .253 .320 .369 .288 .238 .204 .162~ 
"B" Grade 
Sq. Ft. 
(5) Compiled b.y U. S. Dept. ot Labor, 
Bureau ot Labor Statistics 
• From 1930-1932 tigured on composite 
market rather than Boston. 
The oost~ ot the ,upper leather are to be examined in exactly the 
same manner as was the cost ot sole leather. We again turn to the 
Bureau ot Labor Statistics Reoords to find the prioes of the repras-
entative forms ot this type ot leather. The above table (Table IX) 
shows the prioe per square toot of representative forms of upper shoe 
leather in dollars. Here again we apply the statistical tool ot in-
dexing in order to arrive at a more usetul schedule for analysis pmr-
poses. As before the average tor 1923-25 wil~ be taken as a basis 100 
upon which basis the price index tor each of the year8',,'will be deter-
mined. Table X presents the information given in Table IX in a usable 
indexed form. 
.. 0 • 
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TABLE X 
'Ohart Showing Index at Wholesale Upper Shoe 
Leather Prices tor Years 1923-193% 
Monthly Average 1923-25=100 
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
L.ea ther-Boston 
l)Oalt.Ohrol!le 
-BII! Grade .969 .995 1.032 .991 1.07 1.221 1.085 .940 .755 .566' 
2)Side Blaok 
Ohrome Tanned .977 .992 1.03 .951 1.203 1.387 1.082 .894 .767 .609 
IB' Grade 
3)Glased Kid 
Top Grade 1.01 .988 1.003 .991 .994 1.05 1.064 1.016 .881 .640 
That this table does not hold the answer to the maintenance ot high 
shoe prices is evident trom inspection. Results herein displayed are not 
tar ditterent trom those retlected tram its sister material table on sole 
leather costs. The glazed kid material has been the most stable but it 
is hot ot importance ot the other two. Like sale leather the 1932 quot-
ations are over 50% under the 1828 quotations. With the exception ot 
the less consequential kid the upper leather prices have moved parallel, 
to the sole leather prices since 1928, so we can say tor this what was 
pre~iously said tor sale leather. For every dollar spent in 1923-25 
for upper leather material the shoe manutacturer needed but ~ but 
siXty-one cents in 1932 for the same material. 
F~D. the above it appears that material costs have little noticeable 
ettect on the price of the finished product in the Boot and Shoe Industry. 
Previous to this the conclusion was arrived at that the decrease in labor 
costs did not evidence itself in the price ot shoes. Now certainly there 
r 
must be some factor absorbing the reductions evidence by the abov: 
statistics. The process of elimination has removed the labor and 
material factors so there remains but overhead and sales and admin-
istration costs and the non-cost factor, profits, left in which to 
allocate the variance. 
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OHAPTER V 
PROFIT STATIST lOS OF THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY 
Baving oompiled workable data in regard to the variations of the 
direot oost oonstituents of the produot of the shoe industry it is now 
feasible to probe into the profit oonatituent. While profit is not a 
real cost item still it oannot be disregarded in a study involvinK prioes. 
Oosts are direotly responsible for the supply ourve, whioh ourve when it 
interacts with the demand ourve determines the prioe figure. This prioe 
figure must be high enough to absorb all of the actual oost outlays in-
volved in the produotion of the good and also leave a residue whioh is 
direoted into the hands of the produoer in the form of profits. This 
residue must exist else the producer will stop produoing, for in our 
oapitalistio sooiety profits are essential. The sole goal of all in-
dustry is to make profit. There are businesses run not for profit, suoh 
as hospitals, sohools, ohurches, etc. These however, while not interested 
in positive profits, are oertainly interested in reduoing their negative 
profits. so they also can be olassified under this conoept and treated 
with the others. Profit is the reason for the oontinued existenoe ot a 
firm. Onoe profit is removed the entire obJeotive of the business enter-
prise oollapses, and that business enterprise will soon pass into oblivion 
It is true that for a short period a firm will run at a miDDB profit 
(loss), but even here the underlying reason for the firm's oontinued 
existenoe lies in the fact that at that time future profits seeme~ 
attainable. 
All manufacturers are interested in having this residue as great 
• as it oan possible be. Sinoe there are but two variables in its makeup, 
its size is dependent upon the variations ot the variables. Protits can 
be increased by a rise in prices with oosts remaining constant; with a 
lowering at oosts with prices remaining constant.; with a lowering ot 
costs taster than the corresponding lowering of prices; or an inorease 
in prioes taster than the aocompanying inorease in costs. The inverse 
at any ot the above will cause a tall in profits. It might bs well here 
to pause to examine the protit statistios as are released by the United 
States Department ot Internal Revenue showing the oorporation Inoome Tsx 
Returns for the Boot and Shoe Industry. 
The Bureau of Census of the United states Department of Commerce 
reports that in 1929 there were 1,341 establishments manufacturing boota 
and ahoes of material other than rubber. In 1927 there were 1,357 like 
establishments and in 1925 there were 1,460 establishments. These figure a 
are introduced to show how illustrative of the true manufaotaeel' 
picture the profit quotations are. Taking 1929 for example, there are 
included in the Internal .evenue list a report on 1284 out of a poaaible 
1357 firms. It is safe to state, therefore, that any results obtained from 
the figures given by the Internal Revenue Department will be suffiCiently 
representative to be applicable to the entire industry. 
TABLE XI 
I Income Tax Returns of Corporations Engaged in the 
Manufacture of Boots and Shoes * 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
XNCOME GROUP NO INCOME aaoup 
Year Tot&l. Inactive No. Gross Net No. Gross 
Returns Ooncerns Firms Income, Income Firms Income Deficit 
1923 (Figures not computed) -
1924 (Figures not computed) -
1925 
-
(Figures not computed) -
1926 1280 669 786915 50247 611 216476 16290 
1927 1294 4J. 741 909373 65684 512, 194498 12769 
1928 1273 44 695 846556 55355, 534- 240264 16628 
1929 1284 26 711 867654 59336 547 212075 15208 
1930 1284 30 529 590099 33264 725 289510 23175 
1931 1198 33 457 460678 27032 708 278859 24876 
1932 (Figures not yet available) -
* Statistios of Income - U. S. Treasury Department 
Bureau of Inter.nal Revenue. 
It is unfortunate that this department did not release the desired 
figures for this industry for the years 1923-25. Data for the latest 
year is not available since the income tax department is still lagging 
behind in the inspection of the income tax reports, and detailed inform-
ation is not yet obtainable for any year later than 1931. However, we 
must attempt to use the information given to our best advantage rather 
than bemoan the fact that desirable information has been denied us. 
.,0. 
With snch profit figurel aa are available, we are now in ~positiol 
to consider the annnal statns of thia particnlar indnstry. The years 
1923-25 cannot be taken into consideration since these years have been 
nsed aa a basis with whioh the other yeara are being oompared, and 
inspection of these years wonld not reveal any information of great 
importance. It i8 planned , therefore, to consider each year since that 
time in detail to show as far as possible the transitions existent 
and the statn. of the indnstr,y for that year. 
CHAPTER VI 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY 
FOR THE PERIOD 1926-33 BY YEARS 
The preoeding ohapters have in the main eaoh been oonoerned with 
one partioular phase in the make-up of boot and shoe oost. The tables 
therein have all been arranged in a manner that would best show the 
trend of that particular item under consideration during the last ten 
years. Data on production, prices, employment, payrolls, better costs, 
and profits of the Boot and Shoe Industry has been presented, each 
item being considered individually for the ten year per~od rather than 
all the items being considered collectively for any one year. All the 
informative data neoessary for a study of the oondition of the Boot 
Shoe Industr,y for eaoh year has been reoorded but it has not been 
arranged in a manner that would faoilitate an inspeotion for any one 
period. The index numbers, whioh have been oonstruoted wherever ad-
Visable, will permit the contrasting of annual conditions. These 
Qontrasts cannot readily be made without the construotion of new 
tables rearranging the material given in previously oonstruoted 
tables. The figures already investigated will be recompiled into 
full informative tables for eaoh specifio year so that a more complete 
pioture of the Boot and Shoe Industry oan be obtained for that year. 
~~ . 
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AN ANALY!3IS FOR THE YEAR 1926 
TABLE XII 
Table Showing Compiled Data on the Boot and Shoe 
Industry tor the Year 1926 
(1923-25=100) 
Production Index-General Manufactures 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industry 
Price Index-Boot and Shoe Industry 
Shoe Factory Employment Index 
Shoe Factory Payrolls Index 
Shoe Factory Employees Efficiency Index 
Per Oapita Pay Index 
Labor Oosts Indexed 
Sole Leather Oosts Indexed 
Sole Leather Oosts Indexed 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed 
Total No. Firms Reporting Tax 
No. of Firms Showing No Aotive Data 
No. of Firms Making Profits 
Gross Income of Above Group 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
Net Income of Above Group 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
Number of Firms Operating at Loss 
Gross Income of Above Group 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
Deficit of Above Group 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
(Table I) 108.00 
(Table 1) 98.55 
(Table VI) 100.7 
(Table IV) 96.8 
(Table IV) 97.5 
(Table III) 101.75 
(Table IV) 100.72 
(Table V) 98.93 
(Table v:III) 91.0 
(Table VIII) 94.0 
(Table X) 
(Table XI) 1280 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) Aotual No. 669 
(Table XI) Amount $786,915 
(Table XI) Amount $ 50,247 
(Table XI) Actual No. 611 
(Table XI) Amount $216,476 
(Table XI) Amount $16,290 
In analyzing Table XII one finds that while the production o~ 
general manufacturers was considerably in excess of the 1923-25 average 
during the year 1926 the boot and shoe production was slightly less than 
its 1923-25 average. It will be remembered that it has been pointed out 
previously that shoe producers sell in a market in which the demand for 
its product is inelastic and. consequently, fluctuations will be less 
prevalent in this line than in production in general. It was during th3 
year of 1926 that prices began gaining momentum for their hectic rise 
which climaxed in the boom days which immediately followed. 
The price index of shoes in this year is listed as 100.7. This 
means that for every thousand dollars received for shoes during the 
period 1923-25 the shoe manufacturer in 1926 received a thousand and 
seven dollars. This means that prices had risen seven-tenths ot one per 
cent above the 1923-25 average. Shoe factory employment fell ott to 96.8 
while p~rolls tell ott less rapidly to 97.5 so that the laborers who 
were still working were receiving a wage in excess of the 1923-25 average. 
Labor efficiency had increased one and three-fourths per cent. In 1926 
it took 96.~ of the number employed during the 1923-25 working at 97.5% 
of the labor cost for that period to produce 98.55% of the amount of 
shoes formerly produced. If the shoe producer had produced the same 
number ot shoes as the average number turned out in 1923-25, labor costs 
would have been but 98.93% of the former labor cost. This reduction in 
labor cost is accompanied b.Y a reduction of over six per cent in lhe 
cost of sole leather. 
There is hardly any peroeptible ohange in the oost of upper leather. 
Shoe prioes had risen while direot oosts in the shoe industry had de-
olined. Either the remaining oost items, overhead and sales had admin-
istration oosts had risen, or else profits had risen. Figures are not 
available as to any of these items for previous years. In 1926, however, 
about 48% of the shoe firms reporting to the inoome tax department were 
run at a loss. This may be explainable, however, in the faot that the 
shoe firms' reporting profit received over 7~ ot the gross inoome of 
the entire industry tor this year while the torty-e1ght per oent who 
lost money reoeived less than 22% ot the gross inoome ot the industry. 
In other words, the gross inoome of the 669 tirms that made profits was 
more than thtee and o~e half times that of the 611 firms who lost money. 
One half of the firms oolleoted over three quarters of the inoome of 
the industry and made money; the other half found that one quarter of 
the inoome was not enough to earn a profit for them and oonsequently 
they lost money. The net inoomeof those fi~s making profits was 
6.~ of the gross inoome of that group. From an inoome viewpoint, 78% 
ot the gross inoome ot this industry netted a 6.~ dividend to its 
owners in 1926. 
AN ANALYSIS FOR THE YEAR 1927 
TABLE XIII 
,., 
Table Showing Compiled Data on the Boot and Shoe 
Industry for the Year 1927 
(1923-2S-100) 
Production Index-General Manufactures (Table I) 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industry (Table I) 
Price Index-Boot and Shoe Industry (Table VI) 
Shoe FactOry Employment Index (Table I~ 
Shoe Factory Payrolls Index (Table IV) 
Shoe Factory Employees Efficiency Index (Table III) 
Per Capita Pay Index (Table IV) 
Labor Costs Indexed (Table V) 
S91e Leather Costs Indexed (Table VIII) 
Sole Leather Costs Indexed (Table VIII) 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed (Table X) 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed (Table X) 
No. of Firms Reporting Tax (Table XI) 
No. of Firms Showing No Active Data (Table XI) 
No. of Firms Making Profits (Table XI) Actual No. 
.. Gross Income of Above Group (Table XI) Amount 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
Net Inoome of Above Group (Table XI) Amount 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
No. of Firms Operating at a Loss (Table XI) Aotual No. 
Gross Income of Above Group (Table XI) Amount 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
Deficit of the Above Group ( • • .) (Table XI) Amount 
106. 
102.3 
106.46 
102.S 
107. 
107. 
120.3 
1294 
74:l 
$909,373 
$ 6S,68~ 
S12 
$1.94,498 
$ 12,769 
The table of statistios for the year 1927 will be not unlike that 
.., 
of 1926 whioh was Just examined. We will merely retraoe our steps through 
the table onoe again this time fathOming out the data for the year 1927. 
This table (TABLE XIII) informs us that in the year 1927 the boot and 
shoe industry registered a rise in the produotion over the 1923-25 average 
of over five and one-half percent while general industry was deoreasing 
two percent. The prioe of shoes began to rise at a more rapid rate, the 
annual index being more than a pOint and a half higher than the 1923-25 
average. Both shoe faotory employment and payrolls increased over the 
previous year and the employed again reoeived a raise in pay. Payrolls, 
however, were still behind the 1923-25 average, as was also employment. 
The rise of production of the shoe industry far exceeded the employment 
of workers; oonsequently eaoh worker was more productive. One employee 
of 1927 was doing the work of 1.064 employees used in 1923-25. Labor 
costs were lower than in the previous year, for in 1926 to produce the 
number of shoes produced on the average in 1923-25 it would take 98.9zC 
of the 1923-25 payroll while ih 1927 to produce the same number of shoes 
it would take but 94.59% of the payroll. This means that there has been 
a savings of over S% in the per unit labor oosts. 
Material costs show an opposite trend. Material prices had in-
creased more rapidly than had shoe prioes so that manufacturers had a 
much greater per unit material cost in this year than he had in previous 
years. Sole leather was indexed at 102.5 for the scoured backs and 107 
for the union backs. Upper leather increase was still more striking for 
calf had risen to 107 and cattle to over 120. The rise in material costs 
0)-( • 
W9uld tend to raise the direct costs and consequently the total ~sts, 
although the rise was partially absorbed by a lowering of the per unit 
labor cost and the increase in the price of the finished product. In 
spite of the more rapid rise of material costs than shoe prices, a still 
greater percentage of the firms reporting to the income. tax department 
reported making profits, for in 1926 only 52% made profits while in 1927 
59,% reported a favorable return. This may be explainable in the fact 
that since production has increased over 5t%. there is now a market Urge 
enouGh to absorb the output .of the former marginal firms, which firms 
are now included in the profit making class. The percentage of net 
income to the gross income had risen in the profit rnaking group for in 
1927 the net income was 7.2% at the gross income as compared to 6.~ in 
1926. Eighty two per cent of the income of this industry for 1927 led 
to profit for the industry. 
AN ANALYSIS FOR THE YEAR 1928 
TABLE XIV 
Table Showing Compiled Data on the Boot and Shoa 
Industr,y for the Year 1928 
(1923-25:100) 
Production Index-General Manufactures (Table I) 112.0 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industr,y (Table I) 104.57 
Price Index-Boot and Shoe Industr,y (Table VI) 110.6 
Shoe Factor,y Employment Index (Table IV) 93.7 
Shoe Factor,y Payrolls Index (Table IV) 91.7 
Shoe Factor,y Employee Efficiency (Table III) 111.53 
Per Capita Pay Index (Table IV) 97.86 
Labor Costs Indexed (Table IV) 87 .68 
Sole Leather Costs Indexed (Table VIII) 133.2 
Sole Leather Costs Indexed (Table VIII) 139. 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed (Table X ) 122.1 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed (Table X ) 138.7 
No. of Firms Reporting Tax (Table XI ) 1273 
No. of Firms Showing no active data (Table XI ) 44 
I'lo. of Firms Making Profit (Table XI )Actual No. 695 
Gross Income of Above Group (Table XI ) Amount 1846,556 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
Net Income of Above Group (Table XI ) Amount $ 55,355 
(In Thousand Dollars) 
No. of Firms Operating at Loss (Table XI ) No. 534 
Gross Income of Above Group{I~~rf~:nd) (Table XI ) Amount $240,264 
Deficit of Above Group 
" 
(Table XI ) Amount t 16,628 
It was in the year of 1928 that production showed its great~upward 
trend. Production of General manufactures leaped up six per cent over 
that of the previous year and was twelve per cent higher than the 1923-25 
average. Shoe production showed its stability by rising but a. fraction 
of one per cent over that of 1927. Shoe prices however did not remain 
stable. The price index of shoes attains its paak in 1928, at a point 
over 101~ higher than the 1923-25 average. Again. however. material 
costs had risen more sharply than had the price of shoes so that the 
percentage of the material cost per shoe had once more gone up. Sole 
leather had stages the tremendous rise from the 1927 figure, 102.5 for 
scoured backs to 133.2 for this type in 1928 and union backs had risen 
from 107 to 139 in this interim. Upper leather was also a thorn in the 
shoe producers side. for calf had risen from 107 to 122 while cattle 
had risen from 120 to 138. The shoe manufacturer was again favored by 
labor costs, however, which kept on reducing thereby counterbalancing 
the material cost increase. Employment fell off sharply and the shoe 
laborer again registered a rise in efficiency. Shoe laborers in 1928 
were over 11i% more productive than those employed in 1923-25, and the 
per capita pay received by the shoe laborer in 1928 was more than two 
per cent less than the less productive laborers received in 1923-25. 
The 1928 laborers would produce the same number of shoes as the 1923-25 
laborers at f5l.68% of the cost. This reduction of over 12% of the 
labor costs must have helped counterbalance the difference between the 
increase cost of the material const! tuted and the lesser increase in the 
price of shoes. In 1928 profit making concerns fell to 56% of the total 
1iU. 
issuing reports, as compared with 59.% in 1927. The gross income oJ the 
profit making~oup was 3i times that of the non-profit making group, or 
in other words, the fifty six per cent that netted a profit collected 
nearly 78% of the gross income of the industry, leaving but 22% of the 
gross income of the industry to be divided among 44% of the total firms 
in the industry. The net income for this group for this year was 6.5% 
of the gross income, a decrease from that of the previous year. The 
number of firms operating at a loss increased but 4~ over the previous 
year but the receipts of this group inc~eased 23k% over the previous year. 
In spite of this increase in receipts the losses suffered by this group 
were 30% greater than the loss in the previous year. It might be possible 
to explain this by pointing out that with no change in production and the 
tremendous advance of leather costs as compared to the advance in shoe 
prices, the marginal firms began to lose their increment and aGain 
slipped back into the loss group. 
4.1.. 
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AN 4NALYSIS FOR THE YEAR 1929 
TABLE XV 
table 'Showing Oompiled Data on the Boot and Shoe 
Industry for the Year 1929 
(1923-25=100) 
Production Index-General Manufactures (Table I) 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industry (Table I) 
Price Index-Boot and Shoe Industry (Table IV) 
Shoe Factory Employment Index (Table IV) 
Shoe Factory Payrolls Index (Table IV) 
Shoe Factory Employees Efficiency Index (Table III) 
Per Oapita Pay Index (Table IV) 
Labor Oosts Indexed (Table V) 
Sole Leather Oosts Indexed (Table VIII) 
Sole Leather Oosts Indexed (Table VIII) 
Upper Leather Oosts Indexed (Table X) 
Upper Leather Oosts Indexed (Table X) 
No. of Firms Reporting Tax (Table XI) 
No. of Firms Showing no active data (Table XI) 
No. of Firms making Profits (Table XI) Actual No. 
Gross Income of Above Group (In Thousand)(Table XI) Amount 
(Dollars) 
Net Income of Above Group .. (Ta,ble XI) Amount 
No. of Firms Operating at Loss (Table XI) Actual No. 
Gross Income of Above Group (In Thousand)(Table XI) Amount 
(Dollars) 
Deficit of Above Group .. (Table XI) Amount 
119. 
109.7 
107. 
94.8 
92.7 
115.71 
97.78) 
84.76 
110. 
111.6 
108.5 
108.2 
1284 
26 
711 
1867,654 
t 59,336 
547 
$212,075 
$ 15,208 
.~. 
The year 1929 will be recorded in histo~ as the turret year of 
~ 
economic dealings. The tower of prosperity evidenced its top-heaviness 
in this year. It was in 1929 that Depression began its tedious march 
against business. Early 1929 is representative of the prosperity bubble 
at its maximum capaci~y. Production had leaped another seven points so 
that the total goods produced in 1925 were practically one-fifth more 
than the average amount produced in 1923-25. Even shoes showed a great 
reaction, Shoe production rising five points over that of the previous 
year to a point practically 10% higher than the 1923-25 average. Prices, 
having attained their peak in 1928, now gained momentum for their down-
ward slide. The Shoe l~ufacturers were gaining a comparative advanta~ 
with every decrease, the price of Shoes being subject to slight variation 
while ingredients fluctuate widely. In 1929, for instance, the price 
index of boots and shoes fell off three points. This was accompanied by 
slashes in leather costs. Scoured back sole leather dropped 23 points; 
Union backs fell 21 points; calf leather fell 14 points and cattle leather 
30 points. Leather costs in relation to shoe prices were relatively in 
the ~e position as they were in 1923-25. Shoe prices in 1929 were 
approximately ten per cent higher than the 1923-25 average; leather costs 
were also approximately 10% higher than the 1923-25 average. This is a 
contrast to the reduction in labor costs for in 1929 it would take but 
84.76% of the labor costs to produce the 1923-25 average number of shoes. 
Labor efficiency was very high in 1929 for in this year each laborer was 
over 15% more productive than the laborer of 1923-25. Although more 
employees were hired and the pay of each had risen in 1929 over 1928, 
yet neither factory employment nor factory payrolls nor per capita pay 
. ~ 
reached the level of 1923-25. In 1929 Shoe material and prices were 
about the same proportion as in 1923-25 but the shoe manufacturer was 
favored with lower labor costs so he should have been relatively better 
orf than he was in 1923-25. Fifty-seven per cent of the firms reporting 
to the incane tax department reported a profitable year. This profit 
group represented over 80% of Income of the shoe industry for 1929. 
The net income was 6.8% of the gross incane of this year. and although 
more finns showed a deficit for this year than the previous year, the 
total deficit for the year was over eight per cent lower than the total 
deficit of the previous year. Forty-three per cent of the finns in this 
industry were run at a loss, but their combined receipts represented less 
than 20% of the incane of the industry. The total income of the industry 
was but a slight bit less than that of the previous year. Demand activity 
had awakened slumbering finns from their rest to compete with fellow fir.ms 
and now these same finns were wishing that they had been more drowsy so 
that their awaking might have been prevented. 
,AN ANALYSIS R>R THE YEAR 1930 
TABlE XVI 
Table Showing Oompiled Data on the Boot and Shoe 
Industry for the Year 1930 
(1923-25-100) 
Production Index-General Manufact.ures (Table I) 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industry(Table I) 
Prioe Index-Boot and Shoe Industry 
Shoe Faotory Employment Ind~~ 
Shoe Factory Payrolls Index 
(Table VI) 
(Table IV) 
(Table IV) 
Shoe Factory Employees Efficienoy Index(Table III) 
Per Oapita Pay Index 
Labor Oosts Indexed 
Sale Leather Oosts Indexed 
Sale Leather Oosts Indexed 
Upper Leather Oosts Indexed 
Upper Leather Oosts Indexed 
No. of Firms Reporting Tax 
No. of Firms Showing no Active Data 
No. of Firms Making Profits 
Gross Income of Above Group 
Net Income of Abpve Group 
No. of Firms Ope~ting at Loss 
Gross Income of Above Group 
Defioit of Above Group 
(Table IV) 
(Table V) 
(Table VIII) 
(Table VIII) 
(Table X) 
(Table X) 
(Table XI ) 
(Table XI ) 
(Table XI )Actual No. 
(Table XI )Actual Amt. 
(Table XI )Actual Amt. 
(Table XI )Actua1 No. 
(Table XI )Actual Amt. 
(Table XI )Actua1 Amt. 
95. 
92.3 
102.7 
106.46 
86.7 
73. 
84.2 
79.04 
94. 
94.6 
94. 
89.4 
1284 
30 
711 
$861,654 
$ 59,336 
541 
$212,075 
$ 15,208 
45. 
The year 1930 typifies the start of the still existent depre~ion. 
Uncertainty is clearly reflected. The production of general manufactures 
tumbled twenty-four points in this year, to a point even five per cent 
lower than the 1923-25 average. Shoe production skidded to an all-time 
low figure of 92.3% of the 1923-25 average, possibly due to the fact that 
the production of the previous year was greater than the market could 
absorb. The price showed sane reaction for it fell over four points, 
but it still was more than two per cent in excess of the average for the 
basic period. The price of the raw material used in a shoe followed more 
in the footsteps of the general market. Sole leather fell about sixteen 
points to a point six per cent lower than the 1923-26 average. Calf 
upper leather fell fourteen points and cattle upper leather fell nineteen 
points. These reductions carried shoe leather costs to a point below the 
1923-25 average by more than six per cent. Laborers certainly received 
none of the gain obtained by lower leather costs for all figures con-
cerning labor show a decrease. Shoe factory employment has declined 
eight points to an average over thirteen per cent lower than the 1923-25 
average. Payrolls have been cut far in excess of this reduction, payrolls 
being in 1929 but 73% of the 1923-26 average. Per Capita Pay has thereby 
received a jolt, it being but 84.2% of the 1923-25 average, a reduction of 
over thirteen per cent since the previous year. Even the efficiency of 
labor showed a decline of about eight per cent of the 1929 average in 
1930. This decline in labor productivity is probably reflective of the 
fact that employees were not discharged as fast as shoe production fell 
'iI'( • 
off, probably due in part to hopeful expectations of the manufacturer in 
- 41/ 
regard to production. Labor still kept six and one-half per cent above 
the 1923-25 average in productivity. The sharp decrease in payrolls 
meant a lowering of the labor cost factor. For 79% of the labor cost of 
1923-25, the shoe manufacturer of 1930 could produce the same number of 
shoes. This is importa'nt when combined with the fact that leather costs 
were reduced to a figure six per cent below the 1923-25 average for then 
the lowering of direct costs is easily noted in examining the profit 
constituent. It is found that in 1930 less firms made less money than 
recorded before, and that more finns lost a sum in excess of any loss 
recorded before. Only 42 % of the firms reported making a profit during 
this year, as compared to 57% recorded as making profits during the 
seemingly less favorable previous year. The net income of those firms 
making profits fell to 5.6% of their gIQSS income. The reason for this 
decrease in profits is attributa~le to an over-expansion of productivity 
6f individual shoe manufacturers, causing the shoe manufacturer to be 
overburdened with fixed charges and bandicapping him from being able to 
paSi on to the customer the savings obtained by lower direct charges. 
Factories, Equipment, and Machinery, unlike Labor, could not readily be 
dismissed when demand declined. Technology had achieved where man had 
failed; equipment draws its share of the product regardless of its con-
tribution in the output whereas men, in slack times, are expelled to 
exist independently or to starve and die. 
~ ANALYSIS FOR THE YEAR 1931 
TABLE XVII 
Table Showing Oompi1ed Data on the Boot and Shoe 
Industry for the Year 1931 
(1923-25=100) 
Production Index-General Manufactures (Table I) 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industry (Table I) 
Price Index-Boot and Shoe Industry 
Shoe Factory Employment Index 
Shoe Factory Payrolls Index 
(Table VI) 
(Table IV) 
(Table IV) 
Shoe Factory Employees Efficiency Index (Table III) 
Per Oapita Pay Index 
Labor Oosts Indexed 
Sole Leather Oosts Indexed 
Sole Leather Oosts Indexed 
Upper Leather Oosts Indexed 
Upper Leather Oosts Indexed 
No. of Fir.ms Reporting Tax 
No. of Firms Showing No Active Data 
No. of Firms Making Profits 
(Table IV) 
(Table V) 
(Table VIII) 
(Table VIII) 
(Table X) 
(Table X) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
Gross Income of Above Group (In Thousand)(Table XI) 
Dollars) 
Net Income of Above Group If (Table XI) 
Amount 
Amount 
No. of Fir.ms Operating at a Loss (Table XI) Actual No. 
Gross Income of Above Group (In Thousand)(Table XI) Amount 
Dollars) 
80. 
96. 
94.33 
81.5 
63.2 
117.79 
77.54 
65.81 
75.8 
76.7 
75.5 
76.7 
1198 
33 
457 
$460,678 
$ 27.032 
708 
$278,859 
Deficit of Above Group It (Table XI) Amount $ 24,876 
"!iii. 
Accompanying the increase in the intensity of the depression~s an 
increase in advantage to the shoe manufacturer. The year 1931 introduced 
depression on a magnified scale. Demand for goods kept decreasing. Prod-
uction of general cOTIunodities again slumped, this time to the extent of 
fifteen points reaching a point twenty per cent below the 1923-25 average. 
The fortunate moe manufacturer could watch this decrease with eager eyes 
for the annual average of production of shoes rose in 1931 to a point but 
four per cent below the 1923-25 average. The slump of the year 1930 was 
merely a temporary one due to overproduction of the preceding year, and 
. with the decrease in stocks caused by theever absorbing constant demand, 
replacement became necessary with the consequent an increase in the 
production of this good. Price reacted to the general market conditions 
and trailed general prices in their decline. The annual average was only 
94.33, slightly over a five per cent reduction from the 1923-25 average 
price. This disparity bet\veen the price received for shoes and the price 
paid raw materials for shoes received still greater amplification during 
this year. Material costs, it has been found, were approximately but 76% 
of their 1923-25 average. Scoured back sole leather was 75.8% of its 
1923-25 average. price, and union backs were sold'for 76.7% of their 1923-25 
sale price. Calf uppers were 75.5% of their 1923-25 average price. The 
figures also show that the laborers received another reduction in wages, 
a1 though their productivity was higher in thi s year tha.n in any year to 
date. It took but 81.5% of the 1923-25 average number of shoe facto~J 
employees wo rking for a payroll but 63.2% of its fonner size to produce 
an output 96% ot its fonner size. Per capita pay fell to 77.54% of the 
4iI 1923-25 average in spite of the fact that one laborer could do the work 
of 1.118 laborers of the base year. For a payroll less than sixty-six 
per cent of its average during the base period the shoe manufacturer of 
1931 could have the same nwnber of shoes made as was the average for the 
base period. From the profit schedule released for this year by the 
government it can be told that profits were none too plentiful. Their 
absence certainly cannot be attributed to any increase in direct costs 
for drast;;tc reduc"l:iions have been registered in thes8# as has just been 
pointed out. Indirect charges must imbibe these savings. Fixed expenses 
oontracted for by short-sighted managers in a bull session of business is 
the underlying reason. Less "bhan four per out of every ten shoe manuf-
acturers report a profit for the year 1931. The ,39% of the finns in this 
..,\1. 
industry that reported making profits reoeived over 62% of the gross income 
of this industry for' thi s year. The net income of this group amounted to 
5.8% of the gross income of the same group. A comparatively small number 
of firms controlled the greater portion of the receipts and thereby 
profited; a comparatively large number of finns found their income stinted 
and conse.quehtly suffered debit balances upon the close of their year's 
business. Losses incurred in 1931 exceeded by far any figure previously 
recorded. 
AN ANALYSIS FOR THE YEAR 1932 
TABLE XVIII 
Table Showing Compiled Data on the Boot and Shoe 
Industry for the Year 1932 
( 1923-25-100) 
P~duction Index-General Manufactures 
Production Index-Boot and Shoe Industry 
Price Index-Boot and Shoe Industry 
Shoe Factory Employment Index 
Shoe Factory Payrolls Index 
Shoe FactorJ Employees Efficiency Index 
Per Capita Pay Index 
Labor Costs Indexed 
Sole Leather Costs Indexed 
Sole Leather Costs Indexed 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed 
Upper Leather Costs Indexed 
No. of Finns Reporting Tax 
No. of Firms Showing No Active Data 
No. of Finns Making Profits 
Gross Income of Above Group 
Net Income of Above Group 
No. of Firms Operating At A Loss 
Gross Income of Above Group 
Deficit of Above Group 
(Table I) 
(Table I) 
(Table VI) 
(Table IV) 
(Table IV) 
(Table III) 
(Table IV) 
(Table V) 
(Table VIII) 
(Table VIII) 
(Table X) 
(Table X) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
(Table XI) 
63. 
95.1 
88.58 
77.7 
50.8 
122.39 
65.38 
53.42 
60.5 
61.1 
56.6 
60.9 
0.1.. 
The year 1932 began to tax the world's belief in the univerially 
believed truism that there was a bottom in the business cycle. The 
revival of industry expected even by learned ec.onomists was not forth-
coming. The depression became more and more acute. Enterprises 
formerly earmarked by supposed authorities as being sound were found 
seeking salvation in the hands of receivers. Demand for goods lessened. 
People who had money would no·~ spend it; those who did not have money 
(and this involved a considerable number) could not spend. The lack 
of demand reflected itself in the decrease in production. The general 
average of production fell to an average of 63. thirty-seven per cent 
below the 1923-25 average. How different this was fram the production 
of the shoe industry. Shoe production was registered at 95.1. less 
than five per cent below the 1923-25 normal. Their inability to 
capitalize on their fortunate position has already been seen. With 
labor more productive than ever before. with payrolls nearly hal~ed. 
and with leather co sts reduced nearly forty per cent and shoe prices 
less than twelve per cent it certainly appears to be an opportune 
time for shoe manufacturers to make profits. Yet the trend is appar-
ently in the opposite direction. While the 1932 profits are not yet 
ascertainable they are not expected from the tone of the industry to 
be over-abundant. There is reason for cause and blame; the existing 
conditions certainly should not be existent as they are now. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
It will be reJtlembered that previru s mention was made of the 
aocounting truiam concerning wholesale price make-up, i. e., that the 
wholesale price is equal to the sum of the material cost plus labor 
cost plus overhead cost plus sales and admini strative cost plus profit. 
In this study we have inves"t;igated the ohanges in the wholesale price 
of Boots and Shoe s, as well as the changes in the labor, material and 
profit factors. Material for the analysis of these factors has been 
obtained from Government releases. Material for the inspection of the 
trend of the other factors involved has not been released for this 
speoific industry. This necessit~tes the handling of the indireot 
faotors in a negative manner. This is done by the process of elimin-
ation. If none of the known factors explain the final result the result 
must be due to one or all of the unknown factors. In the case in point 
the kncwm result is the changes in the wholesale price of Boots and 
Shoes, and the known factors are the changes in the material costs, 
labor costs and industry profits. What is not definitely given pos-
itively are the changes in overhead, sales and administrative costs. 
The Boot and Shoe Industry is favored with the invaluable economic 
advantage of having an inelastic demand schedule. This industry would 
be ideal for economio planning. With proper econrunic handling, this 
industry could become one of the paramount industries of the economic 
world. This ideal state has been crushed by the anarchic state of our 
04. 
business vw:>rld. Every manufacturer has taken it upon h:ilnself to"'cater 
to the entire demand. The industry has far oveI'-oexpanded for this reason, 
with the ul'cimte result toot all involved are penalized. The public 
suffers for they must pay higher prices for their purchases. The manuf-
acturers are unable to profit. Advertising is merely a competitive 
economic waste for them, for the most advertising will do will be to 
divert purchasing power from one fina to another within the industry. 
The labor factor certainly has been subje,cted to abuses. The cause 
probably lies in the administrative factor which has closed its eyes 
to the economic status of its industry and has acted accordingly. 
The investigation shows that the shoe laborer has increased in 
output and decreased in number. Those now working turn out more gpods 
than before for less wages than before. Those not working will never 
be completely reabsorbed by this industry. Labor cost has had no bearing 
on shoe prices for there is no correlation between shoe price fluctuations 
and labor cost fluctuations. The price or materials also does not have 
much bearing on'wholesale shoe prices. Material cost has varied up to 
fifty per cent without any comparatively variance in shoe prices. It 
can be said that the changes in the direct costs of shoes have not 
recently affected shoe prices materially, a condition that seems hard 
to comprehend and would almost be deemed absurd if stated alone. 
That profit bas not been the all-consuming factor is shown in 
the profit report. The capitalistic interest have not fared any too 
well although they have never been completely deflated. Here too, 
there seems to be a paradoxical situation for one would wonder why a 
mamfacturer could not make a profit with a stable demand .. rel:tively 
high prices. and accompanying low material and labor costs. There 
is but one reason left for to blame for the condition of this industry. 
Indirect costs have been so high that the entire outlay has been 
crippled. 
It is the administrative factor that must be charged with the 
chaotic condition of the Boot and Shoe Industry. Thi s factor should 
have foreseen the results that have been reoorded herein. It was 
this factor that was responsible for the overexpansion within the 
industry. It was this factor which refused to recognize the economic 
status of the industry which it was supposedly a.dm.inistra-t;ing. It 
is unfortunate for all involved that such so-called leaders should 
be allowed to so expensively design the destinies of so many whose 
active voice has been so slight. Perhaps in the future a more 
rational solution to our economic life will be demanded. but until 
then it now appears that a good part of cur world will constantly 
be subjected to penalties by the works of blundering managers. 
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